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BOOK REVIEW 

BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY 
CLAIMS, BY JERRY L. MASHAW. NEW HAVEN & LONDON: YALE 
UNIVERSITY PRESS 1983. 
Reviewed by Richard I. Greenberg· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The times do change. In the 1930's, an exciting group of aca­
demics addressed the problems of unemployment and human need 
and conceived an innovative national solution: The Social Security 
Act of 1935.' Almost fifty years later the program still stands. How­
ever, those giants of the 1930's are gone and we are left with a 
changed program administered bya massive bureaucracy concerned 
with consistency of administration and having no sense of mission or 
vision as to what needs to be achieved. 
In the 1960's and early 1970's, Yale Law School seemed to be 
populated with exciting teachers and writers concerned with restor­
ing mission and vision to the Social Security Administration. They 
addressed a problem created by the Social Security Act and the mas­
sive state and federal bureaucracy assembled to administer it. These 
programs had created a class of citizens dependent on bureaucrats 
they were powerless to influence. These Yale men conceived an in­
novative solution to the problem based on the Constitution of the 
United States. They transformed the unprotected "privilege" of re­
ceiving government largesse into a constitutionally protected "right" 
• Administrative Law Judge In Charge, Springfield, Massachusetts Field Office, 
Office of Hearings and Appeals, Social Security Administration. Adjunct Professor, Col­
lege of Continuing Education and Graduate Studies, American International College.
B.A., Swarthmore College, 1966; J.D., New York University School of Law, 1969. 
This review was written by Richard Greenberg in his private capacity. No official 
support or endorsement by the Office of Hearings and Appeals of the Social Security
Administration, Department of Health and Human Services is intended or should be 
inferred. 
1. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1976 &: Supp. V 1981». 
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to receive statutory entitlements: The New Property.2 This property 
could not be withdrawn by the government without providing the 
claimant an opportunity to hear the case against him and to present 
opposing evidence and argument. 3 These rights supplemented the 
statutory and regulatory procedural protections of the Administra­
tive Procedure Act of 1946 (APA)4 and the right to judicial review 
included by the early drafters and administrators of the Social Se­
curity Act. S 
Now Jerry L. Mashaw, Cromwell Professor of Law at Yale Uni­
versity, tells us this was all wrong. The important things are not im­
aginative solutions to social problems or providing procedural 
protections from arbitrary government action. The important thing 
is consistency of administration or "bureaucratic rationality." He fa­
vors a retreat from procedural due process and opposes legislative 
reform because new programs produce, or at least do not reduce, the 
problems of consistent administration.6 
Mashaw suggests that the ordinary concerns of administrative 
law are nearly irrelevant to the disability adjudication process. He 
describes such concerns as the result of a "sure instinct for the capil­
lary."7 In fact, he considers the APA and due process hearings a 
threat to the ideal bureaucratic system: 
Our individualistic and democratic ideals, embodied in courts and 
legislatures, symbolically contradict the basic thrust of bureau­
cratic rationality. The extemallegal order provides not only inad­
equate remedies for bureaucracy's ills, but also symbols of justice 
or legitimacy that challenge the basic premises of the bureaucratic 
ideal. 
Thus, looking at the administration of the disability program 
2. Reich, The New Property 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). 
3. Id at 783-84 (footnote omitted). 
4. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 
3105, 3344, 6362, 7562 (1982). 
5. As originally enacted, the statute required "fair hearings" in the state grant-in­
aid programs. Social Security Act of 1935, § 2(a)(4), Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 
(1935). The federal programs were amended in 1939 to provide for "[r)easonable notice 
and opportunity for a hearing with respect to such decision, and, ifa hearing is held, [the 
Board) shall, on the basis of evidence adduced at the hearing, affirm, modify, or reverse 
its findings of fact and such decision." Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, 
§ 205(b), 53 Stat. 1360, 1368-69 (1939). The amendments also provided for subpoena, id 
§ 205(d), 53 Stat. 1370, judicial review based on "substantial evidence," id § 205(2), and 
the right to be represented, id. § 206, 53 Stat. 1372. 
6. J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABIL­
ITY CLAIMS 183-93 (1983). 
7. Id at 19. 
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through the judicial symbols of the rule of law-due process hear­
ings and judicial review-we might denounce SSA's [the Social 
Security Administration's] attempts to manage the ALJ [adminis­
trative law judge] corps as the destruction of the claimant's guar­
antee of due process. If we took seriously the democratic 
symbolism of meaningful public participation in the development 
of administrative policy, we would decry the adoption of the grid 
regulations over the objections of virtually all .the participants in 
the rulemaking process, and perhaps urge the invalidation of the 
regulations on that ground alone. We wOllld therefore lament 
both the failure of SSA administrators to follow the lead of re­
viewing courts and the failure of reviewing courts to take a more 
aggressive stance in reshaping SSA administration in its own im­
age, or some quasi-legislative image of participatory democracy. 
I obviously believe that these external modes of "reform" are 
wrongheaded.8 
Mashaw does not limit himself to the Social Security Adminis­
tration's disability program. He believes this lawless example is a 
model of how bureaucracies should be run. 
What appeals to him about the Social Security Administration? 
He is attracted by the unbridled discretion which horrified his fellow 
Yale men of the 1960's: the interpretation of statutes by bureaucrats 
without using APA procedures, the negligible inlluence on policy ex­
erted by the administrative law judge corps, and the administrative 
defiance ofjudicial attempts to change statutory interpretation or in­
lluence administrative procedures.9 
"[B]ureaucratic rationality-at least as practiced by SSA in the 
disability program-is a promising form of administrative justice. It 
permits the effective pursuit of collective ends without inordinately 
sacrificing individualistic or democratic ideals."lo 
This statement is preposterous. The disability program has 
threatened the good reputation of the Social Security Administration 
by causing it to abandon the accepted principles of due process in an 
attempt to make an unworkable program function. The text is a cat­
alogue of the problems that a vague, poorly conceived statute can 
cause even the best intentioned and most competent of bureaucra­
cies. Instead of regretting the compromise of accepted principles of 
administrative law and due process, Mashaw provides praise. He 
recognizes that the result has been inconsistent, expensive, pro­
8. Id at 222. 
9. Compare Reich, supra note 2, wilh J. MASHAW, supra note 6, at 222. 
10. J. MAsHAW, supra note 6, at 222. 
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tracted and unsatisfactory claims adjudication, but insists that these 
are minor flaws which can be cured by further reducing the role of 
an independent appellate process. 
The assumption is that a disciplined and expert bureaucracy can 
make any program work no matter how faulty its enabling legisla­
tion or underlying assumptions. Mashaw dismisses in a few short 
sentences the two most needed reforms: subjecting the bureaucracy 
to the norms of administrative law; and supplanting failed categori­
cal programs with programs that are accurately targeted and ad­
ministerable by fallible humans. Instead, he recommends testing of 
a few minor reforms such as claimant interview during the reconsid­
eration process, II claimant representation at government expense, 12 
and greater use of professionals in the claims adjudication process in 
the form of medical examinations and multiprofessional panels. 13 
It is discouraging that such a careful analysis, which recognizes 
and describes so many of the problems plaguing the Social Security 
Act's Disability program, can still prescribe "solutions" which refine 
and carry on the practices which have brought us to this near chaotic 
state. 
This is a dangerous work, a paean to the unleashed bureau­
cracy. Thankfully the impenetrable prose of Bureaucratic Justice 
will prevent it from having wide influence. 
II. THE NEED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
While the applicability of the rulemaking provisions of the AP A 
may be "only" the result of regulation14 and the present provisions 
for judicial review "merely" statutorylS,surely fourteen years after 
Goldberg v. Kelly 16 it is unquestioned that the adjudication of gov­
ernment benefits is subject to due process review.l' Mashaw grudg­
ingly concedes this is so while clinging to Justice Black's dissent in 
Goldberg .18 Mashaw suggests that despite multiple reaffirmations of 
II. Id at 199. 
12. Id at 200. 
13. Id at 202-209. The first of these experiments has already been incorporated 
into the statute. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(2) (West Supp. 1983). 
14. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1982) exempts matters "relating to ... benefits" from 
formal rulemaking requirements, but 36 Fed. Reg. 2532 (1971) directs that the Depart­
ment of Health and Human Services use the APA procedures. National Welfare Rights 
Org. v. Mathews, 533 F.2d 637, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
15. 42 U.S.C. 405(g) (1976 &: Supp. V 1981). 
16. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
17. Id at 262. 
18. Black believed that because the fourteenth amendment "came into being pri­
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the Goldberg opinion since 1970,19 it should be reversed or at least 
reinterpreted to minimize the process that is due.20 Recent trends in 
federal court actions in cases involving Social Security suggest that 
in the view of the federal judiciary it is still the claimant who needs 
protection from the agency and not vice versa.21 Thus, it is unlikely 
that the type of reform Mashaw advocates will be forthcoming in the 
near future. 
Nevertheless, there is merit in the position that the feeble at­
tempts of the legal profession to bring ad hoc fairness to a program 
whose underlying theory is irrational has produced an anarchy in 
which claims are first adjudicated by a state agency on the basis of 
internal rules22 not subjected to APA rule making,23 then reviewed 
by administrative law judges on the basis of law and regulations in­
terpreted independently by each judge, followed by sporadic, some­
times ill-informed, judicial review of only a handful of cases; 
occasionally without concern for the substantial evidence rule.24 
While this procedure is a form of anarchy, removing the legal pro­
fession from the process of adjudication, even if it were constitution­
ally possible, would not make things better. 
Mr. Mashaw's concern regarding this anarchy in the program is 
plainly justified. And, as Mashaw argues, the solution to such anar­
marily to protect the Negroes from discrimination. . ." it was inappropriate to provide 
its protections to the gratuity which welfare benefits represented. Id at 275 (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
19. Mashaw notes that LEXIS produced 1900 citations to Goldberg in 1981. J. 
MASHAW, supra note 6, at 4 n.IO. 
20. J. MASHAW, supra note 6, at 4. 
21. See Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cit. 1982); Day v. Schweiker, 685 
F.2d 19 (2d Cit. 1982); Mental Health Ass'n. of Minn., 554 F. Supp. 157 (D. Minn. 1982). 
22. 42 U.S.C. § 421(a)(I) (1976 &: Supp. V 1981). 
23. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982). Neither the directives to the state agencies, nor the 
state agency internal directives have been considered subject to the APA procedures. As 
this has been recognized as a source of confusion within the disability adjudication pro­
cess, an attempt has been made to give this material some legal effect by republication in 
the Social Security Rulings. 20 C.F.R. § 422.408 (1983). 
24. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976 &: Supp. V 1981). The judicial review provision stipu­
lates in part that: 
The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evi­
dence, shall be conclusive, and where a claim has been denied by the Secretary 
or a decision is rendered under subsection (b) of this section [entitlement to 
benefits) which is adverse to an individual who was a party to the hearing 
before the Secretary, because of failure of the claimant or such individual to 
submit proof in conformity with any regulation prescribed under subsection (a) 
of this section [rulemaking authority), the court shall review only the question 
of conformity with such regulations and the validity of such regulations. . . . 
Id 
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chy is control of the bureaucracy by imposition of a heirarchial 
structure. Mashaw's vision of the role of administrative law within 
this structure, however, does not comport with traditional notions of 
fairness and due process. It is submitted that imposition of a hier­
archial structure would be best achieved if adjudication were based 
upon published precedent. The decisions of the state agency should 
be subject to adversarial, on the record hearings where the initial 
decision would be defended by the deciding bureaucrat. The deci­
sion of the presiding administrative law judge would be subject in 
tum to the precedential rulings of the Appeals Council. The ulti­
mate authority would be exercised through the publication of regula­
tions by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human 
Services appointed by an elected President with the advice and con­
sent of an elected legislature. Such a program would not cry out for 
judicial redress of palpable injustice as does the present adjudication 
process. Judges would accordingly be less pressured to bend the 
substantial evidence rule or attracted to equitable intervention in the 
internal affairs of the program. Mashaw's suggestion that the way to 
solve the problem of uncertainty in the standards of adjudication is 
to give the civil service managers additional discretion to issue rules 
which will control the administrative law judges2S would seem to ap­
peal only to managerial aspirations. 
Mashaw's characterization of the appellate process as a "capil­
lary" is based on his perception that the mass of cases are adjudi­
cated without the inftuence of the appellate system.26 This is no 
longer factually true. The combination of increasing appeals and 
high reversal rates have raised the percentage of cases receiving ben­
efits as the result of appeal to measureable levels.27 More impor­
tantly, it would improve consistency of adjudication if the appellate 
system exercised inftuence on cases beyond those actually reviewed 
through published precedent. 
Of course the present number of appeals and the bloated ad­
ministrative law judge corps prevent effective function of a prece­
dential appellate process, but there is no reason for the number of 
claims now reaching the appellate level except that it has served to 
25. J. MASHAW, supra note 6, at IS, 104, 145. 
26. Id at 19. 
27. While initial claims dropped almost twenty-two percent between fiscal year 
1981 and 1982, the number of requests for bearing rose almost fourteen percent. DE­
PARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SOCIAL SECURITY AOMIN., PuB. No. 70­
032 (5-83), OPERATIONAL REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF HEARINGS ANO ApPEALS 18 (Sept. 
30, 1982) (hereinafter cited as OPERATIONAL REPORT, Sept. 30, 1982). 
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justify the increasing agency resources devoted to the Office of Hear­
ings and Appeals (OHA) to the great satisfaction of the bureaucratic 
barons who rule the OHA fief. One year after the disability program 
was originally enacted, thirty-five referees were able to handle the 
6000 appeals generated throughout the country.28 Now over 800 
judges are unable to handle 320,000 requests for hearing.29 There 
has been no comparable growth in the number of claims processed 
by the Social Security Administration as a whole.30 The engine for 
this growth has not been the dictates of due process. The blame rests 
with the lawless system of bureaucratic rationality advocated by 
Mashaw. We have an appellate system without standards which en­
courages appeal by generously rewarding litigiousness. 
III. THE VALID CRITIQUE-REvERSAL RATES 
The demand for a restriction in the importance of the hearings 
process is fueled by the unconscionable percentage of cases which 
are awarded by administrative law judges on review, now in excess 
of fifty-three percent.31 Clearly these awards are not made on the 
basis of the same standards used in the initial reviews. Even worse is 
the variation in reversal rates among judges. Published statistics 
show these rates vary from ten percent to ninety percent with sixty­
six percent of the judges reversing more than half the cases before 
them.32 These statistics understate the actual reversal rate since they 
include as unfavorable determinations those cases dismissed on pro­
cedural grounds.33 It is this fact which leads the bureaucratic powers 
within the administration (who are given courage by analyses such 
28. H. HYDEN, TwENTY SIX YEARS OF OHA, (The OHA Newsletter, SSA Pub. 
No. 7()..()4(), Nov. 1983). 
29. OPERATIONAL REPORT, Sept. 30, 1982, supra note 27, at 18 & 21. 
30. The number of monthly benefit awards during the period 1957 to 1981 went 
from 178,802 to 345,254 with the peak reached in 1975 at 592,049. DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., PuB. No. 13-11700, SOCIAL 
SECURITY BULLETIN ANNUAL STATISTICAL SuPP., Table 52, at 109 (1981) [hereinafter 
cited as the SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN of 1981). This understates the program growth 
however since the SSI program was added in 1974. Nevertheless, it is evident that there 
has not been a 1400% increase in the program population as a whole. 
31. OPERATIONAL REPORT, Sept. 30, 1982,supra note 27 at 19. A subcommittee on 
Oversight of Governmental Management puts the reversal rate at 67.2% in mid 1982. 
SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF GOV'T MANAGEMENT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVT'L 
AFFAIRS, THE ROLE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE IN THE TITLE II SOCIAL SE­
CURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROORAM, S. REp. No. III, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). 
32. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES REVERSAL RATES--DISABILITY.INSURANCE, 3 
SOCIAL SECURITY FORUM 4-5 (1981). 
33. Excluding the procedural dismissals raises the official reversal rate from 52.7% 
to 58.4% for fiscal year 1982. OPERATIONAL REPORT, Sept. 30, 1982 supra n.27, at 22. 
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as Mashaw's) to be concerned about whether independent adminis­
trative law judges are consistent with the purposes of the Act. The 
judges have shown little inclination to discipline themselves in this 
matter. Instead they tend to accept the characterization of the ad­
ministration that their decisions are of little worth, representing at 
best a step in the adjudication of an individual claim, having no final 
authority and no context in the program at large. 
The reason for the existence of this problem is not some subtle 
failing in the way in which the decisionmaking process is structured 
within the Social Security Administration or the inferior quality of 
the individuals who make up the administrative law judge corps. 
Accordingly, changes in how decisions are made or even who makes 
them will not necessarily alter the ultimate result. High reversal 
rates among administrative law judges have been tolerated until re­
cent times not because Congress and the program administrators 
lacked the imagination to make the adjustments needed to change 
the situation, but because the high reversal rates were in fact desira­
ble to sustain the political popularity of the Social Security pro­
grams. The process assured the the spumed claimants did not form 
the nucleus of popular dissatisfaction with the Social Security Act 
and its programs. 
The program is financed by taxes which represent thirteen per­
cent of most workers wages.34 Taxes are unpopular. Taxpayers 
must be convinced that their taxes are not being squandered, hence 
the demand for strict standards of eligibility. However, claimants 
also vote and are intensely offended when their claims are denied. A 
strategy of strict enforcement of standards can threaten the viability 
of the program if taxpayers perceive that they are paying dearly fora 
program that does not payoff when they are in need. This problem 
has been avoided by never saying "no". The offended, denied claim­
ant can always appeal and has only himself to blame if he does not 
pursue his claim the full route. Since the time, effort and lack of 
litigious prediliction cause the less aggrieved claimant to accept a 
denial, the administration could afford to buy off a great deal of dis­
satisfaction by paying a large proportion of appealed cases without a 
proportionate increase in program costs. Program consistency suf­
fered, but everyone went home happy. 
This process worked well until recently when two factors led to 
a demand for "reform" which is manifested in the Congressionally 
34. For the current combined FICA rate for 1984, see Rates and Computation of 
Employee Tax, I UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) , 10,216 (Nov. 3, 1983). 
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mandated "Bellmon" review of judges with high reversal rates.3S 
These factors were the exponential growth in the public knowledge 
of the easy fruits of appeal and the financial crises in the retirement 
program. 
The increasing public knowledge of the high reversal rates at 
the administrative law judge level was also fueled by the fruits of 
such appeals for the legal profession. These fruits were sufficiently 
large to warrant front page coverage in The Wall Street Journal. 36 
A further contributing factor to caseload growth has been the 
adminstrative actions ostensibly designed to control the growing 
backlog of appeals. These administrative actions included dispens­
ing with the review of favorable administrative law judge deci­
sions,31 increasing the number of judges,38 providing additional staff 
and machinery necessary to processing ever larger numbers of cases 
with less and less consideration39 and pressuring the administrative 
law judges to decide more cases without ever asking that the quality 
or correctness of the resulting product be considered.40 The result 
35. Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, § 304(g), Pub. L. No. 96-265, 
94 Stat. 441 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 421 note (Supp. V 1981». See also S. REP. No. 408, 
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 52-56, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1277, 1330­
34. Congress may now be swinging in the other direction. A recent Senate subcommittee 
report suggests that the emphasis on review of reversals by the administration was mis­
placed. See supra note 31, at 9. The Association of Administrative Law Judges has filed 
suit alleging that the administration's interpretation of the Bellmon Review has inter­
fered with adjudicative independence. Association of Admin. Law Judges V. Heckler, 
No. 83-124 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 1983). 
36. Growth Industry--DisalJility Cases Under Social Security Are a Boon to Law· 
yers, Wall St. J., Jan. 14, 1982, at I, col. 1. 
37. In fiscal year 1982 after the Bellmon review was initiated, the Appeals Council 
reviewed 12,000 "favorable" administrative law judge decisions as compared with 65,000 
"unfavorable" actions. Social Security Disahility Reviews: The Role ofthe Administrative 
Law Judge, Hearings Before the Suhcomm. on OverSight of Government Management, 
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1983) (testimony of Comm'r Louis B. Hays). The Office of 
Hearings and Appeals, however, reports only 63,559 dispositions by the council in the 
same period. OPERATIONAL REPORT, Sept. 30, 1982, supra note 27, at 26. 
38. OPERATIONAL REPORT, Sept. 30, 1982, supra note 27, at 21. 
39. Id. 
40. The Administration brought an adverse action before the Merit Systems Pro­
tection Board against an Administrative Judge whose only failing was not producing in 
excess of twenty cases per month. The average administrative law judge produced about 
nine decisions per month in 1965. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., Pub. No. 70-032 (6-80), OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE OF­
FICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS, 33, 44 (Sept. 30, 1979) [hereinafter cited as OPERA­
TIONAL ANALYSIS, Sept. 30, 1979). Despite the recommendation of preSiding 
administrative law judge, the Board declined to take adverse action, suggesting that the 
Administration had failed demonstrate that the lack of numbers was equivalent to a lack 
of diligent performance. SSA V. Goodman, No. HQ75218210015 (MSPB Feb. 6, 1984). 
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has been mathematically predictable. More favorable decisions 
meant greater public awareness, greater attorney awareness and 
more appeals. It never bothered the administrators that their efforts 
at backlog control were a consistent failure since the growth simply 
increased the command of the fiefdom on ever greater resources. 
The disability trust fund remained financially healthy. In fact, de­
spite the profligacy of the administrative law judges, the number of 
claimants on the disability roles has fallen steadily since 1977, and 
the number of claims granted per month has fallen since 1975.41 
These facts cannot be explained by the effect of the recent improving 
economic climate or the review of eligibility pursuant to Congres­
sional mandate. No one seriously argues the other possibility, that 
the disastrous increases in private health insurance programs, Medi­
caid and Medicare, have in fact had a positive impact on the health 
of American workers. 
The process affecting the Social Security Administration's pro­
gram was paralleled and possibly abetted by developments in the 
private sector. Despite Mashaw's belief that the private sector had 
been driven from the disability arena,42 private policies providing 
cash benefits in the event of disability proliferated along with Work­
men's Compensation programs. The administration of these pro­
grams is almost unbelievably lax, providing astronomic payouts 
under the most questionable circumstances. Among the private in­
surers there is even less pressure to deny claims since profits are 
made not by a discrepancy between intake and payout but by invest­
ing the proceeds pending payment: the higher the experience, the 
higher the cash flow, the greater profits. These programs also depend 
on the credibility of the expectation of payment. The mushrooming 
expectations of what constitutes a compensable loss of capacity has 
pervaded the factories and workplaces and has created changed ex­
pectations of what is compensable under the Social Security Act. 
This climate changed suddenly with the crises of the retirement 
trust fund. The need for transfusions from the disability trust fund 
(brought on by demographics, not lax administration or unruly ad­
ministrative law judges) led to a bleeding of the disability trust fund 
to support the retirement program. Left to its own devices, the ra­
tional bureaucracy would have responded to the need for reduced 
payments without difficulty. But hell hath no fury like the disability 
claimant scorned. These claimants have an understandably high 
41. SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN of 1981, supra note 30, Tables 52 & 60. 
42. J. MASHAW, supra note 6, at 34. 
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propensity to appea1.43 In the judicial context these appeals have 
great merit as the result of conscious or subconscious considerations 
of res judicata. The courts, Congress and state governments have 
reacted to affirm this precept despite bureaucratic disfavor thus frus­
trating the attempt to control program expenditures. The acceptabil­
ity of inconsistent adjudication has died not because it had interfered 
with bureaucratic rationality, but because financial circumstances 
have changed. The cause of these problems was not administrative 
law, but the failure of bureaucratic rationality. High reversal rates 
will not be cured by attempts to curb the judiciary, but by applying 
administrative law. APA rulemaking procedures and precedential 
decisonmaking are the keys to less arbitrary adjudications and thus 
reducing the high propensity to appeal. 
IV. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
Ultimately this debate about how the program should be ad­
ministered is petty. It is naive to assume that either bringing the 
discipline of classic administrative law to the Social Security Admin­
istration or allowing the bureaucracy full discretion to create arbi­
trary but administrable standards will solve the problems created by 
the disability programs. It is not just inconsistent adjudication that 
troubles the disability program, but also the inconsistency of the dis­
ability program itself with generally understood ideas of fairness. 
Even the most consistent program of adjudication will not remove 
the public concern if evenhandedness still produces socially un­
desireable results. 
An understanding of the source of the disability program and 
how it developed is an aid to understanding its current problems. 
Mashaw does not discuss in detail the philosophical underpinnings 
of the program or its history. He observes briefly: 
[A] disability program was proposed in the original planning that 
led to the Social Security Act of 1935, but no such program was 
even haltingly begun until 1950, and it did not become a full­
fledged early-retirement benefit scheme until 1960. Congressional 
consideration consistently reveals a single dominant reason for re­
luctance to rationalize the Social Security scheme by adding disa­
bility benefits: moral hazard. Tlte disability program could easily 
tum into a residual unemployment program. Intense applicant 
pressure to expand the beneficiary class is to be expected in cycli­
43. OPERATIONAL REPORT. Sept. 30. 1982. supra note 27. at 18. 
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cal economic downturns. The program thus requires very tight 
administration to maintain its integrity. 
The experience of private disability insurance in the 1920's 
suggested that adversarial adjudication was not such a system. 
Several insurers were bankrupted by judicial expansion of their 
policies' conception of the covered risk; and all private carriers 
abandoned the field when judicial construction, in the face of ris­
ing unemployment, made disability actuarially 
unpredictable. . . .44 
A slightly more detailed view of the program explains much 
about its problems. First it is noted that the Social Security Act of 
1935 was the result of intense concern with the results of the eco­
nomic depression that had begun in 1929.45 Workers had lost their 
jobs in great numbers as the result of economic conditions not weak­
ness of character or body. Many had lost their life's savings as the 
result of bank collapse or stock market losses or the decline in value 
of investments. The incoming Roosevelt Administration addressed 
itself first to providing jobs to the able-bodied through programs 
such as the WP A and to providing federal monies to the state relief 
programs to assist all who were in need. Having addressed those 
problems, the next order of business was to create programs for the 
longer term. These programs included not only the program of con­
tributory retirement insurance which we now equate with Social Se­
curity, but also the state-administered unemployment programs and 
grants in aid of state programs to benefit the destitute elderly, depen­
dent children and the blind. The latter programs had historic prece­
dent and were considered non-controversial. Granting federal 
money to assist state run aid to the aged programs was thus placed as 
Title I to the bill to camouflage the more novel and controversial 
national insurance program.46 
Prominently missing from the original Act were programs deal­
ing with health and disability. Workmens compensation plans had 
44. J. MASHAW, supra note 6, at 34. 
45. F. PERKINS, THE ROOTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY 2 (The Beginnings of Social 
Security, OA-OTC Pub. No. 88-72 (11-72». 
An interesting early history of the Social Security Act is provided by a series of 
pamphlets issued by the Social Security Administration bearing the title: The Beginnings 
of Social Security. They represent speeches and interviews with the participants in the 
task force which drafted and guided the passage of the Act. 
46. E. CLAGUE, FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE PASSAGE OF THE SOCIAL SECUR­
ITY ACT 14 (The Beginnings of Social Security OA-OTC PuB. No. 086-72 (11-72». 
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antedated the Act,47 providing limited liability to employers for inju­
ries to workers in the course of employment.48 Health insurance was 
actively considered by the drafters of the original act but was not 
pursued because the vehement opposition of the American Medical 
Association made the matter so controversial as to jeopardize the 
other programs.49 Benefits for workers who became invalids prior to 
retirement age were discussed but deferred along with benefits to 
survivors and dependents. so It is not clear that anyone at that time 
discussed a disability program as we know it today, ie. one provid­
ing benefits to individuals of all ages regardless of past relation to the 
labor market, based on a medically-established inability to perform 
any type of work. 
The federal government entered the fray of disability benefits in 
1950 by adding a new category to the state granted-in-aid program.S1 
The original categorical programs had been Aid to the Aged, Aid to 
the Blind, and Aid to Dependent Children. The new program sim­
ply provided benefits to "individuals eighteen years of age or older 
who are permanently and totally disabled ...."S2 It was up to the 
states, with federal guidance, to fill in the details of who was covered 
and how eligibility was established. It was thought that about 
200,000 workers would be affected and not all states chose to be in­
cluded.S3 The bill had provisions for benefits under the insurance 
titles of the act as well, but these were not adopted. 
In 1954, the first step in the federally administered disability 
program were taken very much in the manner of private insurers, 
not through the provision of cash benefits, but through waiver of 
premium for retirement benefits.s4 A worker would normally re­
ceive benefits from the program at age sixty-five only if he had paid 
into the program for the requisite period of time. All that was ini­
tially provided was that a worker, unable to maintain insured status 
by reason of a medically determinable impairment of long and in­
47. The first workmen's compensation statute was created by New York in 19\0. 
B. BLOOM & H. NORTHRUP, EcONOMICS OF LABOR 695 (1961). 
48. J. BROWN, THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL INSURANCE I (The Begin­
nings of Social Security) SS Pub. No. 85-72 (11-72». 
49. T. ELIOT, THE LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 7 (The 
Beginnings of Social Security OA-TCD Pub. No. 084-74). 
50. E. CLAGUE, supra note 46, at 16. 
51. Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, Pub. L. No. 734, 64 Stat. 477 (1950) 
(codified as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1976 & Supp. V 1981». 
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1351 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
53. H.R. REP. No. 1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1949). 
54. Social Security Act Amendments of 1954, Pub. L. No. 761,68 Stat. \052 (1954) 
(codified as amendment 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1976 & Supp. V 1981». 
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definite duration which prevented all substantial gainful activity, 
would not lose eligibility for retirement benefits. His insured status 
would be frozen thus preserving his eligibility for, and the amount 
of, the benefit already earned when he reached the normal retire­
ment age of sixty-five.ss As the benefit provided was reasonably re­
lated to the test applied, little difficulty was experienced. The impact 
of an impairment on work capacity could be judged against the long 
work history required to establish the insured status being frozen. 
Problems have arisen because the benefits provided have be­
come divorced from the original requirement that there be a long 
connection with the labor force prior to payment of benefits. The 
"freeze" was augmented in 1956 with provision for payment of cash 
benefits to disabled workers who had reached age fifty and to the 
adult children of eligible workers who became "disabled" before age 
eighteen.56 In 1960, payment of benefits to workers of all ages was 
added along with reductions in the requirement that there have been 
recent long connection with the labor force. S7 Further dilution in the 
program occurred in 1965. The earlier requirement that the impair­
ment be of "long and indefinite duration" was liberalized to provide 
for payment of benefits when the impairment was expected to last 
only twelve months or result in death.s8 Payments were also permit­
ted to blind workers who because of their youth had only minimal 
connection with the labor force. S9 The limitation of this provision to 
the blind was deleted in 1968.60 
This extension of benefits to claimants with only marginal con­
nection to the labor force was only one of the ways in which the 90th 
Congress demonstrated its ambivalance toward the purposes of the 
disability program. On the one hand it affirmed that disability was 
not an addition to the unemployment programs by rejecting the 
"hire-ability" standard which had become increasingly popular with 
55. fd. § 106, 68 Stat. 1079. 
56. Social Security Act Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 880, §§ 101 & 103, 1956 
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS (70 Stat.) 942-45, 952-63. 
57. Social Security Act Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, 74 Stat. 924 
(1960) (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1976 & Supp. V 1981». See section 
401(a) of the amendments, id 74 Stat. 967 ("[Ellimination of requirement of attainment 
of age fifty for disability insurance benefits in certain cases."), and section 404(a), id. 74 
Stat. 970 ("Special insured status test in certain cases for disability purposes."). 
58. Social Security Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 303(a), 79 Stat. 
286,366-67, (1965) (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(l) (1976 & Supp. V 1981». 
59. fd., § 344(a), (b), 79 Stat. 412-13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(3)(8) (1976». 
60. Social Security Act Amendments of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821 
(1968) (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1976 & Supp. V 1981». Section 
105(a) provides coverage for "younger disabled workers." fd., 81 Stat. 833. 
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the courts,61 leading. for example, to a district court reversal rate of 
almost thirty-five percent in fiscal year 1965.62 The new standard 
required that the claimant be: 
not only unable to do his previous work but [also) considering his 
age, education, and work experience, [be unable to) engage in any 
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national 
economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate 
area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for 
him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.63 
On the other hand payments were added for those who had no prior 
connection with the labor force: widows aged fifty to fifty-nine. The 
problems with adjudicating these claims was to some extent amelio­
rated by requiring that they meet an "objective" standard of disabil­
ity in the form of a listed impairment. Congress also sought to affirm 
its faith in the medical profession by making explicit the requirement 
that disability be established by "anatomical, physiological, or psy­
chological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically ac­
ceptable clinical and laboratory techniques."64 These amendments 
aided the reduction in district court reversals to less than twelve per­
cent by fiscal year 1977.6S 
The definition of eligibility was completely divorced from real­
ity by its 1974 application in the Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) program to those who by definition had little or no connection 
with the labor market.66 The ultimate absurdity has been the at­
tempt to apply this standard to the SSI childhood disability program 
in which a child can be adjudicated "disabled" on its day of birth.67 
The nightmare of picking out which basinette contains the infants 
capable of substantial gainful activity despite their self evident 
clinical status must haunt everyone in the program. Not surpris­
ingly, district court reversal rates climbed to almost twenty-five per­
cent by fiscal year 1981.68 
The addition of the SSI disability programs to the Social Secur­
61. S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE 
CoNG. AD. NEWS 2834, 2880-2883. 
62. OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS, Sept. 30, 1979, supra note 40, at 36. 
63. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1976). 
64. Id § 423(d)(3). 
65. OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS, Sept. 30, 1979, supra note 40, at 36. 
66. H.R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 4989. 
67. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1983). 
68. OPERATIONAL REPORT, Sept. 30, 1982, supra note 27, at 27. While the rever­
sals decreased three percent in fiscal year 1982, the remands increased 13.6%. Id 
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ity Administration's caseload was not the result of careful social en­
gineering, but a political accident. This program is the carcass of a 
failed attempt to create a guaranteed annual income during the 
Nixon Administration. As originally conceived, the program dealt 
chiefly with the aid to families with dependent children program and 
the debate centered on this aspect of the bill even though it was 
eventually dropped from the conference committee report.69 
The problems produced by state administration of the grant-in­
aid programs had created a demand for federal administration. The 
problems included mushrooming costs to state government when 
federal regulations invalidated state attempts to hold down eligibility 
and a perceived unfairness and uneveness in state administration. 
Transfer to federal administration was politically appealing because 
it immediately relieved the state treasuries and because federal ad­
ministration, as exemplified by the Social Security Administration, 
was thought to be less judgmental and thus less demeaning to the 
claimant population.70 The impact has been the opposite of what 
was desired. The image of the Social Security Administration has 
been tarnished without any noticeable improvement in the quality of 
the relationship between the dependent claimants and the govern­
ment. The conclusion to be reached from this is that the reputation 
of the Administration had been built on the sound basis of an easily 
administerable retirement program, not on a unique form of internal 
organization. 
In creating the SSI program, Congress simply made the existing 
definition of disability applicable to the new group of claimants.71 
There is no indication that any thought was given to whether it was 
appropriate to apply a standard which had developed meaning 
based on its application to claimants with a work background to 
claimants who almost by definition had never worked. Nor did the 
Social Security Administration have prior experience with the appli­
cation of a "means" test designed to separate the "needy" from those 
with the "means" to maintain an adequate standard of living. Hav­
ing determined that a claimant is in need, human administrators 
may have some difficulty in denying benefits to a claimant because 
he has the theoretical capacity for a hypothetical job. Faced with a 
vague statute combining conflicting social goals, the Social Security 
69. See generally D. MOYNIHAN, THE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME 
( 1973). 
70. H.R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 4989-94, 5144-82. 
71. Id at 5013. 
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Administration has produced uneven adjudication. At least with the 
disability program as originally drafted, the Administration had a 
benchmark of past employment to judge the impact of illness on 
work capacity. With the newer programs, it became ever more diffi­
cult to separate the economic and sociological causes of unemploy­
ment from the medical causes. Decisionmakers were faced with 
claimants who had worked despite profound medical problems and 
those who had never worked because of medical problems so subtle 
as to defy detection. 
The problem here is two-fold: I) Our economy does not pro­
vide work to all or even require all to work; and 2) short of coma and 
death, there are no clinical or laboratory findings that are invariably 
associated the incapacity to perform gainful activity. 
As to the first point, Mashaw repeatedly concedes that it is diffi­
cult to distinguish between the unemployed and the disabled. He 
observes that the Act is ambivalent on the point, providing that the 
program is only concerned with the "inability" to perform, not the 
practical availability of work, while also considering age, education 
and past work experience, factors manifestly related only to "em­
ployability" rather than capacity.72 But Mashaw does not berate 
Congress for its ambiguity: "[T]here is in these remarks no neces­
sary criticism of the legislative mandate. Social policy as legisla­
tively crafted into programmatic directives should not be expected to 
emerge as a set of fully coherent approaches to unitary goals."73 
As to the second matter, the lack of scientific measures of the 
capacity for gainful activity, Mashaw recognizes the difficulty in as­
sociating any particular facts with a claimant's capacity to contribute 
to society.74 He fails to understand that the difficulty is practical im­
possibility. "The realization that the ideal of instrumentally rational 
administration cannot be achieved does not justify a resigned cyni­
cism, however, only a more balanced idealism. Our normative ques­
tions need only take account of a complex and compromised 
reality."7s 
Mashaw goes on to propose that because it is possible to reach 
agreement on cases at the extremes-the healthy and the dead-that 
it is also possible to make correct determinations in between, if we 
are willing to pay enough in money and social disruption to obtain 
72. J. MASHAW, supra note 6, at 53-56. 
73. Id at 55. 
74. Id at 63-64. 
75. Id at 78. 
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the necessary information.76 The problem is merely deciding when 
the degree of error becomes too expensive to eliminate.77 It is this 
assumption that misleads Mashaw. A problem such as identifying 
whether a claimant is eligible for retirement benefits is amenable to 
this analysis. The issues are factual: whether the claimant is sixty­
five years old and whether he has the requisite insured status. Ifone 
restricts the investigation of eligibility to asking the claimant for in­
formation to determine whether he qualifies, there will be a certain 
margin of error. This margin may be reduced by spending more and 
more effort on investigation. For example, the Social Security Ad­
ministration may require that the claimant produce a birth certifi­
cate; it may inquire of the bureau of vital statistics as to the validity 
of the certificate; or it may investigate whether the records of the 
bureau are accurate and so forth to a point of diminishing return. 
No amount of investigation will reduce the margin of error in 
making disability determinations. Despite the Congressional admo­
nition that the determinations rest on "objective" evidence, disability 
determinations are inherently subjective. There can be no agree­
ment on what it means to be "unable" to perform substantial gainful 
activity as there are no medical measures of work capacity.78 
The error in Mashaw's analysis is graphically presented at page 
eighty-three of the text. The graph attempts to demonstrate that 
there is a point at which the marginal utility of more refined analysis 
of a claimant's disability reaches zero. The graph shows a straight 
line relationship between a variety of factors. 79 Professor Mashaw 
(and everyone else with a sense of humor) should consider Martin 
Gardner's analysis of the Laffer curve in light of "technosnarl".80 
We do not know that a straight line connects the extremes and we do 
not know whether there is a measureable distance between those ob­
viously disabled and those who are obviously able. The distance is 
likely to be very small and the mathematical function that describes 
the curve is beyond comprehension. This accounts for the conclu­
sions of several studies, including those cited by Mashaw, that 
trained disability examiners asked to adjudicate a sample of cases 
76. Id at 79. 
11. Id at 80. 
78. See generally R. DIXON, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY AND MASS JUSTICE: A 
PROBLEM IN WELFARE ADJUDICATION (1973). This book updates and expands on an 
earlier article: Dixon, The We!fare State and Mass Justice: A Warning from the Social 
Security Disability Program, 1972 DUKE L.J. 681. 
79. J. MASHAW, SIIpra note 6, at 83. 
80. Gardner, Mathematical Games: The Laffer Curve and other laughs in current 
economics, 1981 SCI. AM., Dec. 18. 
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may in fact find approximately the same percentage of claimants dis­
abled but will not agree as to which claimants are disabled or the 
severity of their disabilities.81 
A case in point is a poster that was ubiquitous in the author's 
journeys through New York City as a law student. The advertise­
ment featured a picture of a quadraplegic, confined to his wheel 
chair. His only method of control was a stick held in his teeth: the 
quintessential disablee. The caption: "COMPUTER PROGRAM­
MER-I got my job through the New York Times." The examples 
are everywhere. Our former offices required that claimants be es­
corted to their hearings by an elevator operator who was a diabetic 
paraplegic. When these individuals, who have established their ca­
pacity for gainful activity despite profound impairments in capacity, 
are compared with those who are entitled to benefits because of deaf­
ness, dependent personality disorder, anxiety, or alcoholism, the in­
herent difficulty in determining what truly constitutes a disability is 
made plain.82 
It is submitted that no system, whether designed by bureaucrats, 
experts, lawyers or priests, can give a satisfactory definition to the 
disability program embodied in the present Social Security Act. Be­
cause the program was accreted and not designed, the risk being as­
sumed for the individual by the government is unclear. If it is the 
simple risk of indigency, what purpose is served by categoricallimi­
tations? If it is the risk of illness, why tie the program to capacity for 
hypothetical gainful activity. If it is the risk of unemployment, why 
tie the program to illness? The conflict in these aims and the impos­
sibility of finding an objective measure of human capacity are the 
source of the program's problems, not its method of administration. 
Any attempts to draw conclusions about the ideal design for a bu­
reaucracy drawn from such a program are inherently flawed. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
While Mashaw describes the problems of managing the disabil­
ity program in exquisite detail, he insists that the process which pro­
duced them is basically sound and can be improved by reduction in 
the degree of judicial interference in the bureaucratic process. Can 
these problems be cured by eliminating or curtailing the role of ad­
ministrative law in the adjudication of disability claims? Is the Social 
81. See R. DIXON, supra note 80, at 689,710, describing studies by Saad Nagi, I. 
Goldsborough and others. 
82. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1501-404.1599 and Appendix 1 (1983). 
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Security Administration's lawless adjudication process a model for 
other agencies to emulate? Surely not. Bad cases make bad law. 
The inherent flaws in the disability program explain why the ac­
cepted concepts of adminjstrative law have been abandoned by the 
Social Security Administration. Administrative law requires that 
statutory interpretations by the bureaucracy be tested in one of two 
ways: regulations must be first published and subject to public com­
ment,8) and adjudications must be subject to review by an independ­
ent administrative law judge.84 These procedures add to the fairness 
of administration by leaving the system open to consideration of new 
or unique factors not contemplated by the legislature or by the pro­
fessional bureaucracy. When, as in the disability program, there are 
no clear standards, the system collapses. Every case is unique. None 
are clearly right, none clearly wrong and every decision displeases 
someone. Under these circumstances, the public perception of un­
fairness will not be cured by curtailing the use of administrative law 
which gives voice to the public's concern. It was not administrative 
law which created these concerns. A program which claims to fulfill 
an enlightened and benevolent society's obligations to its citizens 
cannot disappoint those expectations and be non-controversial. The 
disappointed unemployed who maintain the rudimentary capacity to 
contribute to the economy are no less hungry or in need of shelter 
and medical care. They are no less deserving and are indistinguish­
able from those who have managed to convince someone in the So­
cial Security Administration of their eligibility. More importantly, 
they know that they are no less deserving or different from those who 
have been given access to the benefits of disability. They will not be 
satisfied with restructuring of the bureaucracy. What is needed is a 
rethinking of the appropriate solution to the social problems the dis­
ability program was intended to redress. Categorical programs, par­
ticularly those with elastic concepts like "disability" cannot solve 
these problems. Mashaw is simply wrong in suggesting the contrary: 
The legislative standard for disability benefits is obviously the 
problem. And its reform is just as obviously not the solution-at 
least in a world having the expressed political preferences of the 
one we live in. To be sure, the disability judgement can be made 
less poignant by the addition of a negative tax or demogrant sys­
tem, or by including benefits for partial disability. But these 
moves do not make the decisions cognitively less difficult; the lat­
83. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). 
84. 5 U.S.c. § 554 (1982). 
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ter may, indeed, make them more complex.8s 
The vision here is small. The solution is reform: not reform of 
the bureaucracy which will always have human failings best handled 
by the tried and true concepts of administrative law; not the reform 
of the disability program in a way which will continue to distinguish 
between the deserving and undeserving on the basis of an ephemeral 
search for the truly scientific measure of human capacity. The solu­
tion is a universal program which assures employment, medical care, 
housing and food to all citizens not because they have proved them­
selves deserving or unable to support themselves, but because society 
as a whole benefits by not having unemployed, unhealthy, ill-fed and 
ill-housed citizens who are a source of discontent, disease, and crime. 
Most importantly, society as a whole benefits when it does not place 
individuals in the position of proving their inability or uselessness in 
order to receive food, shelter and health care. The disability pro­
gram is neither healthy for citizens, society or administrative law­
yers. All would benefit from a program which encourages workers 
to use their residual capacities rather than hide them lest they be 
penalized. Administrative law cannot solve the weaknesses of the 
disability program but may well be destroyed by it, if we follow the 
path Mashaw suggests. 
85. J. MASHAW, supra note 6, at 185. 
